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Diversity v. Colorblindness 
Patrick S. Shin 
ABSTRACT 
There seems to be broad social consensus that racial diversity is 
generally a good thing. Disagreements tend to focus on the constraints 
we should observe in bringing such diversity about. Evaluating the 
justification of such constraints requires understanding the kind of good 
that racial diversity is supposed to constitute. In this Article, I draw on 
concepts familiar from philosophical discussions in value theory to 
analyze the value of racial diversity on the one hand and that of 
colorblindness on the other. Using several opinions from Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 to 
stake out some of the central positions, I argue first that the value of 
racial diversity is conditional or extrinsic, not intrinsic, but that we 
have both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons to regard it as 
something worth caring about. I further argue that the constraint of 
colorblindness is, strictly speaking, orthogonal to the value of racial 
diversity, because what colorblindness opposes is selecting for diversity, 
not diversity itself, but that the two values come into opposition when 
such selection is required to bring about diversity. I consider the case for 
adhering to the constraint of colorblindness in such circumstances. I 
contend that the strongest positive argument for a deontological 
conception of colorblindness—viz., that it expresses a constitutional 
principle of equal respect—is obsolete. I further suggest that the strongest 
negative argument—viz., that selecting for diversity expresses disrespect 
for persons—ignores the possibility that such selection measures, when 
adopted in response to unjust social conditions, might more plausibly be 




  Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; Ph.D., Harvard 
University (Philosophy); J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks to Eric Blumenson, Mitu Gulati, 
Kim Krawiec, Jeff Lipshaw, Andy Perlman, and Gowri Ramachandran for their helpful 
comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1.  551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1176 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1176 
II. THRESHOLD ISSUES ............................................................. 1179 
III. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY ................................................. 1182 
A. Categories of Value .................................................... 1182 
B. Racial Diversity as Conditionally and Extrinsically 
Valuable ................................................................... 1187 
C. Conditions on the Value of Racial Diversity ............... 1190 
D. The Instrumental Value of Racial Diversity ................ 1191 
1. Group and social benefits ..................................... 1191 
2. The evidential value of diversity as a “signal” ........ 1195 
E. Non-Instrumental Ways of Valuing Racial Diversity .... 1199 
IV. THE IDEAL OF COLORBLINDNESS ....................................... 1202 
A. Eliminativist and Procedural Colorblindness 
Distinguished ........................................................... 1202 
B. Colorblindness as a Deontological Constraint ............. 1205 
C. Instrumentalist Considerations ................................... 1208 
D. Non-Instrumentalist Considerations: Justice Harlan’s 
Argument................................................................. 1210 
E. The “Racial Chits” Objection to Selecting for 
Diversity ................................................................... 1215 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ............................................. 1218 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following claim: 
Other things equal, it is better that a group of people exhibit racial 
diversity than that the group not exhibit racial diversity. 
Perhaps the assertion will seem uncontroversial, as far as it goes. If a 
group can be constituted so that it is racially diverse without making 
it worse in any other respect, without any undesired side effects, and 
without need for any special selection procedures—i.e., all else being 
equal—then why not say that we have reason to prefer that the 
group exhibit that property? Given all of those qualifications, even 
the skeptic may see little reason to dispute the point. Racial diversity 
is generally a good thing. Who would want to deny that? 
Then again, maybe all of those qualifications only make the claim 
more difficult to fathom. If everything else really is held equal, how 
exactly could adding the property of racial diversity make any group 
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of people better? If two groups of people are really identical in every 
other way, and we hold fixed all other circumstances of social 
context, then is it really so clear that the racially diverse group is 
necessarily better? Better in what sense? Sure, racial diversity is a 
good thing, other things being equal, but its value starts to seem 
obscure when we prescind from too many of our actual social 
circumstances. 
So perhaps we had better reflect a bit more carefully. Let us start 
again with the assumption that racial diversity can have positive 
value. Now let us ask a few different questions. Does racial diversity 
always have value, or does its value depend on the existence of other 
conditions? If the latter, what are those conditions? When racial 
diversity does have value, what exactly is the nature of that value? 
What specific reasons do we have to prefer a group that is racially 
diverse to a group that is racially homogeneous? How do those 
reasons hold up against other values that we hold important? Perhaps 
everyone will agree that, other things equal, racial diversity is a good 
thing, but people obviously disagree about the relation of the value 
of racial diversity to other things we value. Namely, they disagree 
about the nature and strength of the reasons that we have to want 
diversity, about whether it conflicts with other values or principles to 
which we should also be committed, and about the priority of 
principles by which such conflicts should be resolved. 
Take, for example, the disagreement among the Justices in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1.2 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that in the 
context of public school education, the “interest in achieving racial 
‘diversity’ . . . [or] in promoting or preserving greater racial 
‘integration’ of public schools”3 is a function of our interest in the 
social consequences that such diversity would help bring about, such 
as the eradication of remnants of past segregation, the enhancement 
of education for all students, and better preparation for democratic 
government.4 For Justice Breyer, the obvious importance of those 
 
 2. Id. Throughout this Article, I will be using the Justices’ opinions in Parents Involved 
to stake out several possible views about the nature of the value of racial diversity versus 
colorblindness. I intend my arguments, however, to be about the value of racial diversity in 
general and not limited to the particular circumstances of that case or to the context of public 
education. 
 3. Id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 843. 
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goals left no room to deny the constitutionally compelling value of 
racial diversity.5 
Chief Justice Roberts, however, was unmoved. He dismissed 
Justice Breyer’s conclusions about the value of racial diversity in the 
public school context as little more than a non sequitur. In the Chief 
Justice’s view, it did not follow from the fact that racial diversity 
might have important social benefits that it was constitutionally 
permissible for school districts to use race-conscious procedures to 
bring such diversity about. As he put it, 
Justice Breyer’s position comes down to a familiar claim: The end 
justifies the means. . . . Simply because the school districts may seek 
a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the 
basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should 
be subject to less exacting scrutiny.6  
For Chief Justice Roberts, even if one were to concede that racial 
diversity in the public school setting might help promote “worthy” 
ends, that would not justify compromising what he sees as the core 
value of the Equal Protection Clause: a deontological commitment 
to a principle of colorblindness.7 
The disagreement between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Breyer implicates an apparently irreconcilable conflict of values, an 
intractable difference of views on what we have most reason to care 
about—or at least what the Equal Protection Clause calls upon us to 
care about—when it comes to issues of racial diversity. I characterize 
the debate in terms of a conflict of values in part to emphasize that it 
seems to transcend disagreements about any particular matter of fact, 
such as whether or not racial diversity really does contribute to 
certain salutary social consequences. This is not to deny that the 
debate encompasses various important factual disagreements. Surely, 
it does. But whatever the conclusions that social science might 
deliver on particular issues in dispute—for example, whether racial 
diversity has measurable pedagogical benefits8—the question of the 
significance that we should attach to those conclusions is not itself 
 
 5. See id. (“If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not 
‘compelling,’ what is?”). 
 6. Id. at 743 (plurality opinion). 
 7. I discuss in more detail below what I mean by a “deontological commitment.” 
 8. Compare Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he evidence 
supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well established . . . .”), with 
id. at 761–65 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism). 
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susceptible to empirical determination. The questions of how and 
whether the importance of achieving racial diversity relates to the 
value of colorblindness (such as it may be) and of how any tension 
between them should be arbitrated depend upon normative 
judgments about what we should most care about and the principles 
to which we should commit ourselves. The task of identifying and 
sharpening these questions is the focus of this Article. 
After addressing some threshold difficulties in Part II relating to 
the definition of “racial diversity,” I devote some time in Part III to 
the explication of a set of helpful categories borrowed from 
philosophical discussions in the theory of value. I then chart out 
possible arguments for the value of racial diversity in each of those 
conceptual categories. In Part IV, I discuss the ideal of 
colorblindness. My main interest there is to investigate how, if we 
assume that racial diversity does indeed have value, the constraint of 
colorblindness could possibly be thought to prevent measures 
designed to bring it about. In Part V, I summarize several key points 
of my analysis and offer some concluding observations.  
II. THRESHOLD ISSUES 
Several threshold problems need to be addressed. The first is that 
not everyone will agree about what the term “racial diversity” 
means.9 More specifically, there is likely to be disagreement about 
what “diversity” means, what “race” means, and the conditions 
under which a particular group can be regarded as racially diverse. 
Furthermore, each of these points of possible disagreement seems 
more or less independent of the others. Agreement about what 
“diversity” with respect to a characteristic means does not imply 
agreement about the meaning of “race,” and agreement about the 
meanings of “race” and “diversity” does not ensure agreement about 
whether any particular group of people can be regarded as racially 
diverse. 
My intent in this paper is neither to resolve nor to dismiss these 
possible disagreements. They are simply not my focus. I will try to 
steer clear of them to the extent that it is possible for me to do so. 
 
 9. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 1149 (2003) (reviewing ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE 
DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2002) (discussing various difficulties in 
understanding the notion)). 
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By no means do I wish to brush off the serious difficulties associated 
with defining the notion of race,10 nor do I mean to take issue with 
critical debunking accounts of the concept.11 I bracket these worries 
because I do not think that addressing them is particularly helpful to 
understanding the values of racial diversity or of colorblindness. So I 
will not use “race” in any technical or specially defined sense, but 
rather to refer to that amalgam of characteristics—e.g., skin color, 
self-identification, ethnicity, ancestry, country of origin, etc.—that 
people ordinarily take into account in making determinations about 
an individual’s race.12 
As for the term “racial diversity,” a slightly different stipulation is 
in order. “Racial diversity” is a context-dependent13 and normatively 
loaded14 term. Some might believe, for example, that whether a 
particular group can be characterized as racially diverse depends on 
how closely the actual racial composition of the group approximates 
some ideal benchmark, such as the actual racial distribution of some 
broader population,15 or perhaps on whether traditionally 
 
 10. See generally LAWRENCE BLUM, “I’M NOT A RACIST, BUT . . .”: THE MORAL 
QUANDARY OF RACE (2002); K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood 
Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE 
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 30–74 (1996). 
 11. See, e.g., Appiah, supra note 10, at 71–74; Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social 
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 12. I do this with the awareness that my usage here could be regarded as objectionably 
naïve. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 36–40 (1991) (distinguishing three different meanings of “race” in Supreme Court 
decisions); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in ROBERT C. POST ET AL., 
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 112–13 
(2001) (discussing Gotanda’s account). 
 13. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 7–8 (2003) (defining diversity 
as a function of differences that “a particular society deems salient” and as dependent on “how 
a particular society perceives differences and which of them it considers salient to people’s 
status”). 
 14. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 46 (2003) 
(discussing the view that “diversity” is a “code word” for a certain sort of redistributive policy); 
SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 8 (“Those who invoke the diversity ideal may hope to associate 
themselves with a political mood or constituency, to convey their adherence to the letter and 
spirit of pro-diversity laws, to avoid having to defend past conduct, to change the subject, and 
so forth.”); Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1153 (“To opponents of affirmative action, 
diversity means quotas and ‘underqualified’ people of color; to supporters, diversity means a 
richer learning environment and social progress.”). 
 15. See LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 24 (hypothesizing, as a “quite common” idea of 
diversity in the employment context, “that one’s workforce reflects in some important sense 
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underrepresented minority subgroups have a substantial presence 
within the group.16 Because my central concern in this Article is an 
analysis of the value of racial diversity, I must avoid any usage of the 
term that risks begging critical questions about the reasons we have 
to pursue it. To that end, I will try to adhere to a primarily 
descriptive rather than a prescriptive or normative usage of the 
term.17 I shall simply understand racial diversity as a rough measure 
of the heterogeneity of a group’s members in respect of racial 
phenotype. I will say, on this understanding, that a group in which 
all individuals share membership in a single race has an absence of 
racial diversity, that a group in which more than one racial subgroup 
is present has at least some racial diversity, and that a group in which 
many racial subgroups are present and substantially represented has a 
higher degree of racial diversity. This is, to be sure, an extremely 
vague account, but for my purposes should suffice. What is 
important for the present discussion is to be clear that I will be using 
“racial diversity” as a descriptive term, rather than as an implicit 
reference to some normative ideal for the constituency of any given 
group of people. 
These stipulations clear the way for a discussion of the value of 
racial diversity while avoiding intractable threshold disputes. I do not 
believe that the central disagreements about the value of racial 
diversity hinge upon differences of view as to the proper conception 
of race or as to what specific criteria or measures should be used in 
determining whether a particular group is racially diverse. I am not 
saying that disagreements about the value of racial diversity never 
come down to such conceptual differences of view.18 But people who 
agree about the concepts of race and diversity might still disagree 
about the value of racial diversity, and people who agree about the 
value of racial diversity might not agree about the best way to 
 
the demographic composition of the surrounding society”); SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 164 
(criticizing the tendency to think of diversity in terms of “proportional representation”). 
 16. For a critique of definitions of diversity based on statistical underrepresentation, see 
Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of “Diversity,” WIS. 
L. REV. 105, 131–46 (1993) (discussing the difficulties of constructing a meaningful notion of 
diversity consistent with a commitment to substantive equality). 
 17. See SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 20 (distinguishing between descriptive and 
normative diversity). 
 18. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 15–16 (voicing concern that disagreements 
about the significance of diversity may in many cases stem from disagreement about what it 
really means). 
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conceive of race and diversity. The clash between Justice Breyer and 
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, surely does not reduce to a 
theoretical disagreement about the concept of race or about what 
constitutes true racial diversity. Resolving whatever disagreements 
they might have on those matters would not settle their basic 
dispute. Agreement on a definition of racial diversity would only 
sharpen the issue that separates them. Is racial diversity something 
worth caring about? And even if it is, is it the sort of value that could 
justify using race-conscious procedures to produce it? It is to those 
issues that I now turn. 
III. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY 
A. Categories of Value 
On one modern philosophical approach to value, we can say that 
a thing is valuable when it gives us reason to hold certain favorable 
attitudes or to take certain favorable actions with respect to it.19 But 
not everything that is valuable provides the same sorts of reasons for 
action or calls forth the same sorts of attitudes. We might agree that 
both a stock certificate and a finger painting given to us by a child 
are things of value, but the way in which we value the former is 
different from the way in which we value the latter. A pair of familiar 
distinctions allows us to differentiate among the various ways in 
which things have value or in which we value things. One is the 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value, and the other is the 
distinction between valuing something instrumentally and valuing 
something as an end.20 Understanding these distinctions will help us 
sort out just what someone might be claiming when making an 
assertion that racial diversity is (or is not) valuable or good. 
 
 19. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 95 (1998). On Scanlon’s theory 
of value, which he calls a “buck-passing” account, a thing’s goodness or value is not itself a 
reason-giving property that the thing possesses. Id. at 95–98. Rather, for a thing to be valuable 
is simply for the thing to have other properties that provide and constitute reasons to respond 
to it in certain ways. See id. at 97. I am in general agreement with Scanlon’s account, but the 
discussion of this paper should not depend on any particular theory of value. For recent 
discussions of the buck-passing account of value, see, for example, Roger Crisp, Goodness and 
Reasons: Accentuating the Negative, 117 MIND 257 (2008); Jonas Olson, Buck-Passing and the 
Wrong Kind of Reasons, 54 PHIL. Q. 295 (2004); and Pekka Väyrynen, Resisting the Buck-
Passing Account of Value, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 295, 295–324 (Russ Shafer-
Landau ed., 2006). 
 20. See generally Rae Langton, Objective and Unconditioned Value, 116 PHIL. REV. 157 
(2007). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:09 PM 
1175 Diversity v. Colorblindness 
 1183 
The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is usually understood as having 
to do with the source of a thing’s value, or more precisely, the extent 
to which a thing’s value depends on its relation to other things. 
Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable simply in itself,21 
regardless of its relation to anything else that might be valuable.22 To 
say that something has intrinsic value is to say that its value or 
goodness does not depend on external conditions and so is in that 
sense unconditionally good,23 or that we always have reason to want 
it to exist.24 In contrast, something is extrinsically valuable if its value 
depends on conditions external to it, such as the condition of being 
causally related to a particular consequence, or the condition of 
being regarded as valuable by a particular person.25 
The distinction between instrumental value and value as an end 
has to do with whether the value of a thing depends upon its 
usefulness in bringing about, or its potential to give rise to, desirable 
states of affairs. We regard a thing’s value as purely instrumental if we 
value it entirely for its potential to bring about such consequences.26 
We regard its value as non-instrumental if we value it for its own 
sake, as an end in itself, or for reasons other than considerations 
relating to its usefulness in bringing about any particular set of 
 
 21. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, Two Distinctions in Goodness, in CREATING THE 
KINGDOM OF ENDS 249, 250–51 (1996). 
 22. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 2–3, 19 (1993). 
 23. KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58 (interpreting Kant). 
 24. G.E. Moore famously suggested that a thing could be thought to have intrinsic 
value if we would consider it worthwhile for the thing to exist “even if there were absolutely 
nothing else in the Universe besides.” G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 68 (1912) [hereinafter MOORE, 
ETHICS]; see also G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 187 (1903); NOAH M. LEMOS, INTRINSIC 
VALUE: CONCEPT AND WARRANT 10–11 (1994). Of course, on this definition of intrinsic 
value, one might well believe that nothing has intrinsic value (although Moore himself 
assumed this was not possible, G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA, supra, § 17 ¶ 2) or that only 
some very limited classes of things do, such as rational beings. Immanuel Kant famously argued 
that the only thing that was unconditionally good was a “good will,” i.e., the motive of acting 
in accordance with duty. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 7 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); KORSGAARD, 
supra note 211, at 257. These ontological questions about value are not particularly germane 
to my discussion here. What is important for my purposes is that one can value a thing for its 
own sake (i.e., non-instrumentally) without being committed to any belief that the thing has 
intrinsic value in the Moorean sense. It is also possible to regard something as instrumentally 
valuable even while also believing that it has intrinsic value, as I suggest below. 
 25. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19; KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58. 
 26. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE PRACTICE OF VALUE 15–16 (2003) (“Things are of mere 
instrumental value when their value is entirely due to the value of what they bring about, or to 
the value of what they are likely to bring about or may be used to bring about.”).  
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further consequences or results.27 According to one influential 
account, the intrinsic-extrinsic and instrumental-end distinctions are 
best regarded as orthogonal.28 A slightly different recent account 
suggests that we think of instrumental value simply as one species of 
extrinsic value.29 The precise relation between the two sets of 
distinctions, however, is not critical for my own purposes here. What 
is important is to note the two sets of questions that can be asked 
about a thing’s value. First, is it valuable unconditionally, in and of 
itself? And second, whether it is valuable in and of itself, do we value 
it as an end (for its own sake), for its usefulness in bringing about 
certain results, or for other reasons? I take the first question as 
relating to the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction and the second as 
relating to the instrumental-end distinction. 
Returning to our examples, we might say that the value of the 
stock certificate is extrinsic and wholly instrumental. Its value is 
extrinsic in that it depends and is conditional on the significance it is 
given by the rules of various financial and legal institutions.30 We can 
also say that the stock certificate is instrumentally valuable insofar as 
we value it merely as a means of securing, or as a representation of, 
 
 27. Langton, supra note 20, at 162–64. 
 28. Christine Korsgaard argues that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction bears on the way in 
which a thing can have value, whereas the instrumental-end distinction bears on the way in 
which we value a thing. See KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 250, 257; Langton, supra note 20, 
at 160 (discussing Korsgaard’s view). 
 29. See Langton, supra note 20, at 163–64. Langton’s account is an elaboration and 
modification of Korsgaard’s view. Langton argues that Korsgaard’s approach may be too 
limiting. According to Langton’s alternative approach, the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction can 
apply both to the way in which a thing can have value and to the way in which we value things. 
For Langton, to value something intrinsically is to value it for its own sake, and to value 
something extrinsically is simply to value it for the sake of something else. She suggests that we 
think of valuing something instrumentally as a specific way of valuing it for the sake of 
something else, i.e., as a subspecies of valuing something extrinsically. Furthermore, according 
to Langton’s proposal, while a thing can have either intrinsic or extrinsic value, she suggests 
that we think of a thing as extrinsically valuable if it gets its value from another source, and that 
instrumental value be regarded as one specific type of extrinsic value. See id. There are, of 
course, many other ways in which philosophers have tried to explicate the notion of intrinsic 
value and the distinctions among the ways in which things can have value or be valued. See, 
e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 2–3, 19; RAZ, supra note 26; Warren S. Quinn, Theories of 
Intrinsic Value, 11 AM. PHIL. Q. 123 (1974); Judith Thomson, On Some Ways in Which a 
Thing Can Be Good, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 96 (1992). 
 30. Cf. KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 257–58 (equating extrinsic value with 
conditional value). 
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other things that we value.31 Similar examples might include things 
like tools, paints, medicines, maps, and so on. 
Not all extrinsically valuable things, however, need be regarded 
as having purely instrumental value. In other words, the value of 
some things can be conditional or dependent on their particular 
contexts, yet not consist in their usefulness in bringing about any 
further results or consequences. We might think of the value of the 
child’s finger painting, for example, as entirely extrinsic yet non-
instrumental. Our reasons for regarding the finger painting as 
something good or valuable have nothing to do with its usefulness as 
a means to any further end, so we do not regard its value as 
instrumental. But we would not think of the object as having any 
value in and of itself. Objectively speaking, it is perhaps nothing 
more than a haphazard smear of random colors. The finger 
painting’s value depends on conditions external to it, such as the fact 
that it was given to us by a child as an expression of her affection for 
us. The value of the finger painting is in that sense extrinsic yet non-
instrumental. 
We think of the child herself, of course, as being both non-
instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. The child’s value does not 
depend on her usefulness, and we would also say that her value, like 
the value of any person, is not conditioned on anyone’s actual 
attitudes or actions with respect to her. She is valuable and worthy of 
moral respect by virtue of being a person or her status as a 
(developing) rational agent. Some might argue that certain natural 
phenomena—think of the Grand Canyon or perhaps an unspoiled 
rainforest—are also both non-instrumentally and intrinsically 
valuable, insofar as our esteem for those things has nothing to do 
with what they can be used to produce, and insofar as they could be 
thought valuable even if no one actually cared about them.32 We can 
say of such things that they are valuable and good just by virtue of 
the sorts of things they are, and that we value them for their own 
sakes or as ends in themselves. 
The categories of instrumental and intrinsic value are in a limited 
sense mutually exclusive, in that it would be contradictory to say that 
something was both intrinsically valuable and that its value was 
 
 31. As Rae Langton points out, however, a misguided miser might value the stock 
certificate as though its value was non-instrumental and intrinsic. Langton, supra note 20, at 
165. 
 32. See MOORE, ETHICS, supra note 24, at 68. 
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merely instrumental. If we regard something as intrinsically valuable, 
then we necessarily also believe that its good derives at least in part 
from something besides the consequences it can effect. But it does 
not follow that intrinsically valuable things can only be valued for 
their own sakes.33 It is certainly possible to regard as instrumentally 
valuable something that holds intrinsic value. If, for example, our 
child’s finger paintings unexpectedly become objects of critical 
acclaim and popular fancy, an unscrupulous art broker might come 
to regard the child as a mere instrument to further his own financial 
ends. Similarly, an industrialist who regarded the unspoiled rainforest 
as a source of lumber might similarly be described as treating as 
instrumentally valuable something that is good in itself. We might 
say that the art broker and the industrialist are in some sense making 
mistaken and morally objectionable judgments about the value of the 
objects of their interest. Perhaps we might even say, more generally, 
that bearers of intrinsic value ought not be valued as mere 
instruments. But it seems nevertheless true that it is possible for 
people to regard as instrumentally valuable things that could (and 
perhaps should) be valued for their own sakes. 
By the same token, it seems possible to value for its own sake 
something that we might think ought to be regarded as merely 
having instrumental value. A miserly billionaire, for example, might 
regard the continued accumulation of his personal wealth as good in 
and of itself,34 rather than as a means for securing goods or services 
for himself or others. Whereas regarding intrinsically valuable things 
as mere instruments (as do the art broker and industrialist above) can 
be morally objectionable, the sort of misvaluing that the miser is 
guilty of seems not so much immoral as it does misguided, irrational, 
or fetishistic.35 Our beliefs about the nature of a thing’s value — i.e., 
whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic—thus influence our judgments 
about the way in which we ought to value the thing —i.e., whether 
as a means to further ends or for its own sake. 
Clarity about the nature of a thing’s value and how we ought to 
value it is important to evaluating claims about the extent to which 
 
 33. For a very insightful discussion on this point, see Langton, supra note 20, at 162–
65. 
 34. See id. at 165. 
 35. Of course, we might also criticize the miser on moral grounds if his fetishistic 
attitude toward money was causing him to be uncharitable or otherwise neglectful of duties he 
owes to others. 
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that thing is worth promoting, protecting, or otherwise caring 
about. For example, suppose that you come across a stack of your 
child’s finger paintings as you are cleaning out your office. I walk by 
and see you wistfully admiring them. I coldly argue that the 
paintings are not worth preserving because they are nothing but 
random splotches of ugly colors on cheap paper that serve no useful 
function and have no monetary worth. How will you respond? 
Surely, you will not be moved by my argument. Why not? It is 
because my argument is nothing more than an assertion that the 
finger paintings have neither instrumental value nor intrinsic 
significance. But, of course, your reasons for caring about the finger 
paintings have nothing to do with those considerations. You might 
agree that they are not valuable either as useful instruments or in 
virtue of their intrinsic merits, but you value them nonetheless.36 You 
do not necessarily believe that the paintings have any value or worth 
in and of themselves. They are valuable because they arise out of 
your relationship with your child. You care about the finger 
paintings not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that 
relationship. Their value is extrinsic yet you do not value them in a 
purely instrumental way. My blindness to this possibility was my 
mistake in dismissing your interest in the finger paintings. 
B. Racial Diversity as Conditionally and Extrinsically Valuable 
Let us venture into more controversial waters. Finger paintings 
are one thing; the problem of specifying the value of racial diversity 
is another. What can we say about the value of racial diversity? 
Diversity is a property of a group of individuals.37 Of course, 
particular individuals can contribute or detract from a group’s racial 
diversity, but it is the group, not its members individually, that bears 
the property of diversity. We can start, then, by asking whether racial 
diversity is an intrinsically or extrinsically valuable property for a 
group of people. 
I stated above that to say that a thing is intrinsically valuable 
means that its goodness does not depend on external conditions. 
Thus, to say that a particular property is intrinsically valuable is to say 
 
 36. Here is a case in which Langton might say that you simply value the finger paintings 
extrinsically. See Langton, supra note 20, at 163. 
 37. Groups can of course be composed of subgroups, and so one might also talk about 
intergroup diversity, see SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 20–21, but I am concerned here with 
diversity within groups composed by individual persons. 
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that it is unconditionally good that something be characterized by it, 
or that we always have reason to want that property to be present. If 
racial diversity has intrinsic value, therefore, we should always have 
reason to want a group of people to have this property, whatever the 
circumstances. This does not seem altogether plausible. 
Under some conditions, it would seem at best a matter of 
indifference whether a group possessed racial diversity. Suppose a 
band of violent criminals walks into a bank and takes everyone inside 
hostage. Is it necessarily a good thing that the hostage group be 
racially diverse as opposed to homogeneous? If the band of criminals 
happens to be all white, would we be inclined to say that it would be 
better if that group were more racially diverse? 
These questions are of course absurd. We have no reason to care 
about the hostage or criminal group’s racial composition, much less 
to prefer that either group reflect any sort of diversity. The hostages 
are a group of people suffering various wrongs at the hands of their 
captors. If the racially homogeneous composition of the hostage 
group were the result of some non-random circumstance (e.g., the 
criminals’ racist motives), we might have reason to regret the 
existence of that circumstance or resent those responsible for it. At 
most, however, this would show that there are some conditions 
under which we might have reason to be concerned about the 
group’s racial composition. It does not show that it would be 
intrinsically better that the group be racially diverse. Assuming that 
the composition of that group of people is a matter of pure 
happenstance, I do not see how one could say that it would be better 
for that group, better for anyone else, or better from some agent-
neutral perspective that the group be racially diverse. The same 
seems true of the criminal group. The perpetrators are engaging in 
legally and morally impermissible conduct, and the group’s racial 
composition seems (prima facie) immaterial to any judgment about 
the goodness, badness, or moral character of that group. There is no 
reason to think that the presence of racial diversity among this group 
of criminals would be in itself a good or bad thing. 
This simple thought experiment shows, I believe, that the good 
of racial diversity is not intrinsic or unconditional.38 We cannot say 
 
 38. George Sher asserts that in debates about diversity, “the appeal to intrinsic value is 
essentially a nonargument.” George Sher, Diversity, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 97 (1999). His 
assertion comes in the context of a broader contention that all arguments in favor of diversity-
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that it is valuable, in and of itself, whenever and wherever it appears, 
nor that we always have reason to promote it or bring it about. The 
value of racial diversity is therefore extrinsic, in that it depends upon 
the particular conditions and circumstances in which it is present. 
One might object here that my hostage scenario distorts our 
thinking about the value of diversity and cannot support any general 
claims about the nature of that value, because the two groups of 
people I identified in that case—the hostages and the criminals—are 
not groups that are worth caring about in the first place. One might 
argue, in other words, that no one cares about the racial diversity of 
hostages and criminal enterprises because those groups are 
themselves devoid of value. Perhaps racial diversity is always a good 
thing in groups or communities that have institutional value or at 
least legitimacy.39 
It is not obvious to me that this is in fact the case.40 But even 
assuming this qualified statement to be true, the very need for the 
qualification only proves my point. The value of the property of 
racial diversity is conditional: it depends on the context in which it 
arises. It is perhaps a good thing given certain conditions but 
perhaps not others; or perhaps it is good for some groups and 
irrelevant to others. Perhaps the good of racial diversity depends on 
certain basic features of the group that possesses or lacks it; or 
perhaps it depends on various conditions characterizing society at 
large. In any event, the value of racial diversity appears to be 
conditional and hence extrinsic, rather than intrinsic in the sense of 
being good in and of itself. 
To say that racial diversity is not intrinsically and unconditionally 
valuable does not diminish its significance. It only establishes that its 
value is contingent on the conditions under which it obtains. The 
examples I have suggested show, for example, that whether there is 
any reason to care about a group’s racial diversity may depend at 
least in part on the nature of the group itself, including its purposes 
and the circumstances of its formation. While this conclusion should 
 
based affirmative action rely on backward-looking attempts to rectify past injustices, see id. at 
103, a conclusion that I do not endorse. 
 39. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57 (discussing institutional structures, such as 
markets, that value diversity). 
 40. Suppose a group of people join together to make an anonymous donation to 
support relief efforts following a natural disaster that devastates some urban community. All 
else being equal, would we say that it would be preferable that this group of anonymous 
donors be racially diverse? It does not seem to me that it should matter. 
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be at some level perfectly obvious, it flushes out an important 
implication. Because racial diversity is not an intrinsic good, the mere 
fact that some action will increase a group’s racial diversity does not 
necessarily count as a consideration in favor of taking that action. 
There is nothing about racial diversity in itself that explains why and 
under what conditions it is worth caring about. This is what it means 
to say that the value of racial diversity is extrinsic. Any explanation of 
that value must provide an account of the circumstances that make it 
the case that racial diversity can be regarded as having value. 
C. Conditions on the Value of Racial Diversity 
Let me begin an effort towards such an explanation by making 
some general observations about the types of settings in which the 
racial diversity of a population seems to be relevant. Generalizing 
from some of the examples discussed above, the racial diversity of a 
group seems irrelevant—neither good nor bad—in cases where the 
group does not constitute a socially legitimate community or 
association. On the other side of that coin, it seems that we do tend 
to regard racial diversity as a good thing in various contexts that 
touch on the basic institutional organization of our society.41 These 
contexts include employment, education, and governance. To be 
clear, I assert that it seems desirable that the groups of people 
operating in these settings be characterized by racial diversity rather 
than by racial homogeneity. This seems true whether or not we 
would be justified in attempting to bring about racial diversity in 
these contexts through any particular means. Whatever one’s views 
on the latter score, I take it to be uncontroversial that the presence 
of racial diversity in the groups that populate these settings is 
generally a good thing, something to be glad for when it is present 
and something to be worried about when it is not. Much the same 
can be said with respect to the areas of life that give structure to our 
social interactions, such as residential and interest-based 
communities. It seems good that those interactions take place in the 
presence of racial diversity, and it seems bad, although not without 
 
 41. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Racial Integration as a Compelling Interest, 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 15 (2004). 
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exception, when our social interactions are limited to racially 
homogeneous groups.42 
Thus, putting aside for the moment the controversial question of 
whether and how we should actively try to bring about racial 
diversity in any of these various contexts, it seems we can say at least 
that it would be in general a good thing for racial diversity to 
characterize the various domains and sub-domains of public and 
private employment, educational institutions, local and national 
politics, interest-based organizations of all sorts, and residential 
communities. We might also plausibly conjecture that the value of 
racial diversity in these contexts derives from their centrality to the 
proper functioning of our economic, political, and social institutions, 
and the just distribution of economic goods and opportunities. We 
care about racial diversity, in other words, not for its own sake, but 
for the sake of the value we place on the well-functioning of our 
social institutions and our democratic way of life in general. 
These observations broadly suggest some of the contexts in 
which we tend to care about racial diversity. True as they might be, 
they do not address the reasons we might have to do so. Granted 
that our concern for racial diversity derives from our concern for, say, 
the value we place on certain forms of social interaction, the hard 
question is why our valuing the latter should be thought to provide 
grounds for caring about the former. Given that we care about racial 
diversity for the sake of broader social concerns, how exactly does 
the one concern follow from the other? 
D. The Instrumental Value of Racial Diversity 
1. Group and social benefits 
Here, it becomes helpful to ask whether the value of racial 
diversity—given our conclusion that it is extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic—is instrumental or non-instrumental. Let us consider both 
possibilities. One familiar argument in favor of promoting racial 
diversity in various contexts is that it has good consequences for all 
members of the group in which such diversity is present, such as 
improved learning outcomes or beneficial socialization effects in the 
 
 42. I say this advisedly. Surely, there are particular cultural contexts in which 
homogeneity is not bad. We might imagine, for example, a group of rabbis engaged in prayer, 
or more intimate groups defined by familial relations. I discuss this point in a bit more depth 
below. See infra Part III.E.  
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educational context,43 productivity benefits44 in the workplace,45 or 
better46 outcomes in various decision-making contexts.47 Thus, racial 
diversity is not valuable for its own sake, but is instrumentally 
valuable as a means of bringing about further consequences that 
directly benefit groups that have it.48 
A related but distinct argument is that racial diversity in certain 
contexts is instrumentally valuable not only because of its immediate 
effects for the groups or particular institutions that have it, but 
because of its longer-term potential to produce benefits for society as 
 
 43. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 843 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 44. For a recent, extended argument concerning such benefits (though not focused on 
racial diversity specifically), see SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF 
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 319–20 (2007). 
 45. There is a wealth of established and ongoing empirical research studying the effects 
of diversity in corporate organizations, teams, and workgroups. See Karen A. Jehn et al., Why 
Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in 
Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741 (1999); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret Neale, What 
Differences Make a Difference? The Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 
PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 31 (2005), as reprinted in SCI. AM., Aug. 2006, at 32 
(abridged); David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for 
Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 79; David B. Wilkins, From 
“Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based 
Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1571–
89 (2004); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly III, Demography and Diversity in 
Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 77 
(1998); Eric S. Nguyen & Douglas Brayley, Good Business: A Market-Based Argument for Law 
Firm Diversity 7–9 (Working Paper, May 21, 2008) (citing numerous studies), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124224. 
 46. Relevant senses of “better” might include fairer, more accurate, and more 
empathetic.  
 47. An example might be the claim that a racially diverse court is better because it would 
be likely to produce fairer, more enlightened, or more empathetic decisions than a non-diverse 
court. Similar claims about the decision-making abilities of diverse as compared to non-diverse 
groups might be made for other contexts as well. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial 
Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury 
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 608–10 (2006); John M. Conley et 
al., Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: What Corporate Insiders Say About Why 
Diversity Matters 9–24 (Univ. of N.C. Legal Stud., Working Paper, Paper No. 1415803, 
2009), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415803.  
 48. This idea is nicely captured by one formulation of a basic research hypothesis for 
social scientists studying the benefits of diversity: “Identity diverse groups perform better than 
homogeneous groups.” PAGE, supra note 44, at 319. The posited value of diversity here is that 
it enhances group performance, which is in turn valuable insofar as that enhanced performance 
will help the group bring about its goals. (Diversity of “identity” is not necessarily the same as 
racial diversity, but the point is still the same.) 
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a whole.49 One especially familiar instantiation of this argument is 
that it is good for elite educational institutions to promote racial 
diversity among their student bodies50 because these institutions 
provide a path to future leadership positions both in private industry 
and in government.51 By enrolling significant numbers of minority 
students, these institutions can “seed” the upper echelons of private 
industry and government with traditionally underrepresented racial 
groups, with a view to ameliorating race-based economic inequalities 
and providing role models to encourage future generations of 
disadvantaged minorities to pursue similar success.52 Another similar 
argument is that exposure to and participation in racially diverse 
groups tends to enhance attitudes of tolerance53 and reduce racial 
bias among all members of those groups,54 which in the long run 
would tend to reduce discrimination, promote healthy social 
relations among all citizens, and lead to a more just society.55 
The argument that racial diversity may have instrumental value 
does not entail any claim that racial diversity is intrinsically good,56 
 
 49. See David Orentlicher, Diversity: A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L. 
REV. 777, 782–87, 795–803 (2005) (arguing for the beneficial consequences of diversity in 
education and employment). 
 50. See generally WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: 
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS (1998); Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1610 (2003) (arguing that the promotion of racial diversity can be justified as 
a means of improving the conditions of society). 
 51. “[T]he path to leadership must be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals 
of every race and ethnicity.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (O’Connor, J.). 
 52. This is essentially the argument advanced by Justice O’Connor in her Grutter 
opinion. See id. at 332–33. 
 53. LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 95 (discussing the “civic-toleration” argument for 
diversity (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 50, at 228)). 
 54. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67, 1109–10 (2006) 
(proposing the use of certain special circumstances of racial diversity as a way to reduce racial 
bias); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2000) (noting a broad range of research finding that “intergroup contact ‘will 
reduce prejudice’” given certain other limiting conditions) (quoting H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC 
CONFLICT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 115 (1997)). 
 55. Racial diversity might help effect justice in more localized institutional contexts as 
well. Consider, for example, recent research suggesting that racial diversity in the composition 
of juries might increase the quality of their deliberations and the soundness of their verdicts. 
See Sommers, supra note 47, at 608–10. 
 56. Nor does it imply that racial homogeneity is intrinsically bad. 
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that it is itself valuable as an end,57 or even that it is immediately 
beneficial for the particular group in which it is present. Instead, it 
assumes the existence of certain conditions, such as economic 
inequalities that disproportionately disadvantage certain racial 
minority groups, and that we (as a society) have reason to take action 
to correct those inequalities or other circumstances of injustice.58 
The “seeding” and role-model arguments in favor of cultivating 
racial diversity amount to no more—and no less—than an assertion 
that creating such diversity in certain locales provides a means to that 
end. On this sort of view, the value of racial diversity lies in its 
usefulness as a tool in realizing certain states of affairs in the future.59 
Moreover, on this view, what we ultimately care about is bringing 
about those future states of affairs, rather than about racial diversity 
in itself.60 
An obvious and important implication of staking the value of 
racial diversity on its potential for producing beneficial consequences 
or making a causal contribution to some future state of affairs is that 
the value of diversity becomes dependent upon a set of hypotheses 
that are subject to empirical verification or challenge.61 On the 
instrumentalist view of racial diversity, whether or not racial diversity 
truly is worth caring about depends on whether achieving it in a 
particular context does in fact produce or contribute to its claimed 
beneficial consequences. If the value of racial diversity consists 
exclusively in its instrumental efficacy, then successful challenges to 
that efficacy62 will also, as a matter of logic, disprove its value.63 
 
 57. Recall that it is possible for the value of a thing to be extrinsic yet non-instrumental. 
The finger painting given to you by a child (discussed above) is a possible example. 
 58. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 50; Orentlicher, supra note 49. 
 59. See Greenberg, supra note 50, at 1618 (“What I find more interesting than the 
diversity argument [as justification for affirmative action] is its further justification of 
affirmative action for what it does for society as a whole . . . . ‘[T]he whole “nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure” to the ideas and mores of students as 
diverse as this Nation of many peoples.’” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 313 (1978))). 
 60. See id.; Orentlicher, supra note 49. 
 61. And of course, the testing of these hypotheses is a current focus of ongoing social 
science research. See, for example, the various studies cited at supra notes 44–48 and infra 
note 62. 
 62. Examples of such challenges include studies questioning whether racial diversity in 
the classroom really does produce better educational outcomes, whether diversity in the 
workplace really does contribute to greater productivity, and whether racial diversity in 
residential settings really does improve inter-racial relations. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 760–66 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
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Along these same lines, another implication of pinning the value 
of racial diversity to its beneficial effects is that if one could show an 
equally effective method of producing those same consequences 
without cultivating racial diversity, we should have no particular 
reason to prefer the promotion of racial diversity over those other 
equally effective means. Rather, the choice between those two means 
of producing the desired consequences should be a matter of 
indifference.64 We could still say that racial diversity had value, but 
that value would simply be identical to the value of the other means 
of arriving at the same results. This conclusion again falls out directly 
from the assumption that the value of racial diversity consists wholly 
in its instrumental value. 
2. The evidential value of diversity as a “signal” 
Although the view of the value of racial diversity as a means of 
effecting desirable social consequences is perhaps the most prevalent 
instrumentalist view,65 it is not the only possible one. A somewhat 
more nuanced view involves regarding the value of racial diversity as 
consisting in the information it provides about the group that has it. 
We may value racial diversity, in other words, for what it “signals” 
about such groups.66 On this view, we may think of racial diversity as 
 
(citing studies and expressing skepticism about pedagogical benefits of diversity); Lisa Hope 
Pelled et al., Exploring the Black Box: An Analysis of Work Group Diversity, Conflict, and 
Performance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 20–24 (1999) (reporting some counterproductive effects 
of racial diversity in the workplace); Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and 
Community in the Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137–38 (2007) 
(arguing that increases in ethnic diversity appears to be correlated with increased social 
isolation in the short run). 
 63. As Peter Schuck puts the point, someone who sees the value of diversity in its 
potentially beneficial consequences should be “agnostic about diversity.” SCHUCK, supra note 
133, at 66. 
 64. If that conclusion seems implausible, that might indicate the pull of non-
instrumental considerations in favor of racial diversity, to which I turn below. 
 65. Cf. Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: 
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004) (noting 
that current legal justifications of affirmative action have shifted away from remedial rationales 
and toward instrumental justifications based on the benefits of the diversity thereby produced). 
 66. The term “signal” has a rich, somewhat technical signification and usage in certain 
areas of social science research. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 24–26 
(2000). An adequate treatment of signaling theory is far beyond my scope here. For an 
excellent and concise summary of the basics, see Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 
446–50 (2008); see also Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the 
Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998). 
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good just because of the value we place on other attributes that are 
connected to such diversity. 
For example, we might think of racial diversity as good for a 
group of people in the same way that a physiological indicator of 
health, such as achieving good results on an exercise stress test, 
might be regarded as good for a person.67 Passing a physical stress 
test is not valuable for its own sake, but neither would it be quite 
right to say that it is valuable for what it can be used to bring about. 
It is a good thing for a person to be able to pass a stress test because 
it evidences good health. It is a proxy for something good, but not 
something that we value for its usefulness in bringing about desirable 
effects.68 Similar observations could be made about a newborn baby’s 
cry or a dog’s wet nose. Neither the infant’s wailing nor the moisture 
on the pet’s nose is good for its own sake, nor for any particular 
effects they produce. Rather, we think that it is good for a dog’s 
nose to be wet and for the newborn to cry because those things are 
indicators of wellness and proper functioning. Along these lines, one 
might say that it is good for a group to exhibit racial diversity, 
because the fact of diversity indicates that the group is in some 
respects socially healthy, e.g., that it does not engage in exclusionary 
discrimination and perhaps that it is committed to a certain 
progressive ideal of equality. The existence of racial diversity provides 
us with valuable information about the group that has it. We might 
call this an evidential account of the value of diversity. 
If racial diversity can be valuable for the information it provides, 
what exactly is that information? The answer will depend greatly on 
the broader circumstances of the group. For example, the existence 
of racial diversity in a random group of people on a subway train 
might signal nothing of particular interest, normatively speaking.69 
This seems consistent with what I think most people would say in 
this context—namely, that we have little if any reason to care 
whether the group exhibits diversity or not. On the other hand, the 
existence of racial diversity in the partnership ranks of a large law 
 
 67.  See Recovery Information Fine-Tunes Stress Test Results, HARV. HEART LETTER, 
June 2003, at 1–2. 
 68. Id. 
 69. This is not to deny that the presence (or absence) of diversity on the train might 
provide a basis for various factual inferences, such as demographical information about 
locations along its route. 
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firm might allow us to draw more significant inferences,70 and one 
might say on the basis of such inferences that it would be a good 
thing for racial diversity to exist in that kind of group. On the 
evidential theory of racial diversity as signal, this is because the 
existence of diversity in that context probably does not happen by 
accident and therefore says something of interest about the firm’s 
values, commitments, and priorities—perhaps, for example, that 
members of the firm share an ethos of equality or justice. If we are in 
favor of such values and commitments, then we will be inclined to 
believe that the presence of racial diversity is, quite literally, a good 
sign. And one can believe that racial diversity is a good sign in this 
sense without also believing that it is valuable for its own sake or that 
its value depends on its ability to produce beneficial effects. 
So does the evidential theory of racial diversity’s value amount to 
an instrumental view of racial diversity or a non-instrumental view? I 
think that the view is somewhat difficult to categorize. One might 
argue that the evidential view actually implies that racial diversity 
itself has no value, and that what really bears value, if anything, is 
whatever state of affairs—e.g., adherence to practices of 
nondiscrimination or underlying conditions of justice—that the 
condition of diversity is supposed to evidence. So, in the law firm 
example, we might be able to make certain kinds of inferences about 
the firm based on its level of diversity, but the only thing we would 
really have reason to care about is whatever set of circumstances gives 
rise to that diversity, not about the fact of diversity itself. 
At the same time, it also seems true that racial diversity regarded 
as a signal could be regarded as valuable in virtue of its usefulness. 
The signal of racial diversity could be instrumentally valuable in the 
same sense that any kind of information can be useful in the service 
of further ends. The dog’s wet nose is useful to the veterinarian in 
making an assessment of the dog’s health. In the same way, the 
existence of racial diversity in a particular group or community might 
be useful to a governing body in determining whether particular 
policies or programs are working fairly, equitably, or otherwise as 
they should be. And to outsiders who might be considering joining 
the membership of a group, the presence or absence of racial 
diversity might be useful in understanding certain values and 
 
 70. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Diversity Among Elite American Law Firms: A Signal of 
Quality and Prestige 24–29 (Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
777504. 
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commitments of the group that might not otherwise be 
ascertainable. 
It might be thought that the evidential view of racial diversity is 
logically inconsistent with any view that would favor the creation of 
racial diversity as a means of effecting justice: if the dog’s wet nose 
and the newborn’s cry are really just signals of good health, we 
would be foolish to splash water on a dog’s nose or make the baby 
cry in order to bring about a condition of health. But we must be 
careful here. Even if one were to regard racial diversity as 
epiphenomenal in some sense with respect to basic conditions of 
justice, it would not necessarily be foolish to aim at diversity for the 
sake of bringing about the conditions that it is supposed to signal. 
Bringing about racial diversity is obviously very different from 
squirting water on a dog’s nose: in many contexts, it cannot be 
accomplished without significant institutional resolve and deep 
commitment. This is precisely what makes racial diversity valuable as 
a signal. If it were easy and costless to produce, its evidential value 
would be very low.71 It seems plausible, therefore, that the process of 
creating diversity might itself effect deep social consequences. 
Indeed, it might even be the case that the kind of commitments that 
are required to create racial diversity in certain contexts also tend to 
effectuate other more basic conditions of justice. If that were true, 
then not only would one expect racial diversity to have an evidential 
relation to those basic conditions, but it might nevertheless make 
sense to aim at racial diversity for the sake of bringing about those 
conditions, particularly if targeting the former turned out to be 
easier or more practicable than the latter. In that sort of scenario, it 
might make sense to aim at racial diversity as a sort of surrogate for 
the conditions of justice that it tends to signal. 
A final way in which racial diversity as a signal might be regarded 
as instrumentally valuable is as a means of communicating certain 
information about a group to outside observers.72 Suppose, for 
example, that racial diversity is a reliable signal of a commitment to 
an ethos of equality and justice. If so, then a group might regard the 
attainment of diversity as an effective way of communicating to 
outsiders that it shares that ethos. Racial diversity might, from this 
 
 71. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 66, at 449. 
 72. Cf. Wilkins, supra note 45, at 1591–95 (identifying some incentives law firms might 
have to advertise their diversity). 
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perspective, be like an advertisement of the group’s commitment to 
certain norms,73 or even of its prestige,74 and its value might then lie 
in its usefulness as a means of inducing others to form certain beliefs 
about the group.75 
E. Non-Instrumental Ways of Valuing Racial Diversity 
So far, I have been considering several ways in which racial 
diversity could be thought instrumentally valuable, or useful in the 
service of further ends. Are there any non-instrumentalist (yet 
extrinsic) accounts? Are there arguments for regarding the racial 
diversity of a group as having positive value that does not depend on 
its usefulness or its desirable effects? 
I suggest two arguments for the goodness of racial diversity that 
do not derive from the value of its effects. First, one might argue 
that racial diversity is good for particular groups and communities 
that have it, even apart from any further consequences that diversity 
might facilitate, in the same way that, say, developing a variety of 
talents might be thought good for an individual person. Consider 
what we (if we were in a certain Aristotelian frame of mind) might 
say in the case of the individual. We might say that it is a worthwhile 
goal for a person to develop her talents, whether or not this is 
instrumentally useful to him or anyone else, simply because trying to 
achieve one’s full potential is part of what constitutes human 
flourishing and hence is part of what defines the notion of good for 
human beings.76 It is worth pursuing for its own sake if one cares at 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. See G. Mitu Gulati & David B. Wilkins, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 599–601 (1996) (explaining 
how the existence of racial diversity might be regarded as a sign of excellence or prestige in the 
law firm context). 
 75. There is, of course, the possibility of false signals, i.e., the possibility that a group 
might manufacture a certain level of racial diversity to make it appear that it is committed to a 
certain vision of equality, when in fact it is not. But, as noted above, creating racial diversity in 
the contexts we care about it most tends to be costly and requires a great deal of institutional 
resolve. This tends to reduce the likelihood of a “false” signal. See Broome & Krawiec, supra 
note 66, at 449. 
 76. Cf. Christine Korsgaard, The Dependence of Value on Humanity, in RAZ, supra note 
26, at 79 (arguing that the values of some things are internal to the very idea of those things). 
Notice that this claim that racial diversity is good for its own sake is different from the claim I 
rejected earlier that racial diversity has intrinsic value. We might value racial diversity for its 
own sake, but that value may be thought to derive entirely from the value of the community 
that has it. See KORSGAARD, supra note 21, at 264; Langton, supra note 20, at 163–64. 
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all about one’s own good.77 One might make a similar argument that 
racial diversity is naturally good for people joined in community. 
Racial diversity is something that a community has reason to pursue 
for its own sake, because it partly constitutes a certain ideal of human 
interaction and society; and so one cannot care about the good of a 
community without also caring about that community’s racial 
diversity. The argument is not that racial diversity is intrinsically 
good, but that it is part of an instantiation of human community to 
which we are committed, and so to value the latter is necessarily to 
value the former. 
I think this argument runs up against some difficulties. For one, 
it helps itself to a conception of an ideal community that needs to be 
argued for, as I suspect not everyone will find it to be self-evidently 
correct. Is it really the case that racial diversity, or diversity of any 
other kind for that matter, is necessarily a constitutive aspect of 
community? I think there is reason for skepticism here. It would 
suggest, for example, that communities within racially homogeneous 
societies are somehow deficient qua community, even if the society’s 
homogeneity is purely a happenstance of, say, geographical isolation. 
It would also suggest that, within the context of a racially diverse 
society, interest-based groups that might voluntarily be formed for 
the sake of celebrating shared racial identities could not live up to an 
ideal of human community. Those conclusions seem to me to 
depend on an implausibly narrow notion of what constitutes a good 
community. We can agree that racial diversity enhances many kinds 
of communities without necessarily having to accept that it is 
constitutive of the very ideal of community. 
A second non-instrumental approach to understanding the value 
of diversity is perhaps a slight variation of the first. Whether or not 
racial diversity is constitutive of the good of human community, we 
might say, more modestly, that given the fact of a racially diverse 
society, valuing racial diversity within the society’s various 
institutional domains is constitutive of a commitment to social 
equality and justice.78 More specifically, if the broader population of 
 
 77. This is not quite the same as claiming that developing one’s own talents has intrinsic 
value (if that is taken to mean that it is unconditionally good), because the value of human 
flourishing itself depends on there being value in the good of human beings. 
 78. See Lizzie Barmes & Sue Ashtiany, The Diversity Approach to Achieving Equality: 
Potential and Pitfalls, 32 INDUS. L.J. 274, 292 (2003) (noting a basic distinction between 
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a society is characterized by a certain racial diversity, and if we are 
committed to a conception of equality or justice under which all 
segments of society are entitled to the same opportunities with 
regard to occupation, civic participation, political life, and residential 
community, then we must also regard racial diversity within those 
relevant institutional contexts as good, insofar as such diversity is a 
necessary concomitant of that sort of equality.79 In other words, if 
the realization of certain conditions of justice and fair equality of 
opportunity would entail the distribution of various goods, positions, 
and offices among all segments of our diverse society, then one could 
not regard the realization of those conditions as good without also 
seeing racial diversity in the relevant institutional contexts as good 
(to the extent that the absence of such diversity would be 
inconsistent with the satisfaction of those aforementioned 
conditions).80 On this sort of view, the good of racial diversity is a 
practical consequence of the good of the realization of certain 
conditions of justice, and so valuing racial diversity would simply be 
part of what constitutes a commitment to that conception of 
justice.81 Racial diversity on such a view is not good in virtue of its 
effects or because of its usefulness, but is good insofar as it partly 
constitutes the realization of a certain notion of justice and 
substantive equality. This is an extrinsic but non-instrumental 
account of the value of racial diversity. 
 
“valuing diversity for instrumental . . . reasons and valuing diversity for intrinsic, justice 
reasons”). 
 79. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57 (describing a view of diversity as “a possible, or 
even probable consequence of individuals’ autonomous exercise of their wills and rights” and 
suggesting that on this sort of view, “the diversity that flows from these exercises of individual 
freedom is presumptively valid”). 
 80. This argument assumes the fact of racial diversity. It would go through neither in 
the case of a society that lacked diversity, nor in the case of a society that had such diversity but 
for which racial difference lacked social or psychological salience. In the latter sort of society, 
racial diversity might be regarded in the same way that we regard, say, diversity of eye color, 
and would have no practical bearing on matters of justice or equality. A society in which racial 
difference had no actual significance probably would have no reason to worry about 
distributional disparities corresponding to race, or at least no more reason than we have to 
worry about inequalities corresponding to eye color. I take it as given that our society is one in 
which racial difference does have significance as a matter of historical and present fact. For 
helpful discussion of this point, see Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in APPIAH 
& GUTMANN, supra note 10, at 163, 163–76; Foster, supra note 166, at 127–38. 
 81. Cf. SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 57. 
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IV. THE IDEAL OF COLORBLINDNESS 
So far, I have been discussing ways in which racial diversity might 
be regarded as valuable without considering any constraints that 
might exist on how a community or other group that lacks it might 
go about producing it. One might believe that racial diversity is a 
good thing in contexts such as education, employment, and 
governance, but not that the value of such diversity is sufficient to 
justify every possible way of bringing it about. In other words, it 
might be agreed that, other things equal, it is better for certain kinds 
of groups to be racially diverse than not, but the “other things” that 
must be controlled include limits on the methods employed to 
engineer diversity where it would not otherwise exist. 
The ideal of colorblindness is, for Chief Justice Roberts, one of 
those limits. It is the fly in the racial diversity ointment. We might 
(charitably) assume that the Chief Justice agrees that racial diversity 
is a condition that could have instrumental or non-instrumental 
value in at least some contexts. Even so, he might, without logical 
inconsistency, take issue with the further assertion that it is 
permissible in those contexts to bring diversity about by methods 
that conflict with the constraint of colorblindness.82 What, then, is 
the nature of the conflict between the value of racial diversity and a 
commitment to the ideal of colorblindness? 
A. Eliminativist and Procedural Colorblindness Distinguished 
We need to distinguish between two varieties of colorblindness. 
One set of arguments for colorblindness amounts to a sort of 
promotion of the value of national or social unity.83 The idea here is 
that we as a society ought to celebrate and promote that which all of 
us have in common—viz., a shared identity as citizens of a single 
nation—rather than engage in actions and policies that tend to 
validate and preserve the notion that racial differences mark any real 
 
 82. This position—that racial diversity is good but that we should not abandon 
colorblindness for the sake of producing it—is evidently one that enjoys broad popular 
support. See Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll, Americans Reject Means But Not Ends of Racial 
Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, § 1, at 1, 32 (“[M]ost Americans today endorse the 
goal of racial diversity in schools and offices, but reject some of the main methods used so far 
to achieve it.”). 
 83. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 17 (1998); 
Lawrence Blum, Ethnicity, Disunity and Equality, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 193 (Laurence Thomas ed., 2008) (discussing Schlesinger’s argument). 
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differences of identity or community. On this sort of eliminativist or 
assimilationist84 version of colorblindness, the goal of racial justice 
and equality should be to render racial diversity a matter of social 
indifference: we should not care about racial diversity at all because, 
for the sake of promoting national identity, we should not regard 
race as having any socially or politically significant meaning.85 
I am not going to address this eliminativist version of 
colorblindness, partly because it does not seem to feature 
prominently in current debates,86 but more importantly, because the 
question that interests me here is the nature of the conflict between 
valuing racial diversity and the notion of colorblindness.87 The 
eliminativist believes that there is no social value in race, and a 
fortiori, no value in racial diversity.88 If one sees no value in racial 
diversity in the first place, then of course colorblindness follows 
trivially. 
The far more interesting version of colorblindness is the one that 
allows for the recognition of the value of racial diversity. (At least a 
plurality, and probably a majority of the Supreme Court does 
believe, after all, that diversity can constitute a compelling state 
interest.89) This version of colorblindness does not simply fall out 
 
 84. Cf. Gotanda, supra note 12, at 59 (“[Colorblindness implies] a belief that, 
ultimately, race should have no real significance, but instead be limited to formal categories of 
white and Black, unconnected to any social, economic, or cultural practice.”). 
 85. Neil Gotanda offers a sharply articulated critique of this eliminativist version of 
colorblindness. He argues that it “would require abolishing the distinctiveness that we 
attribute to Black community, culture, and consciousness” and therefore constitutes a sort of 
“cultural genocide.” Id. at 59–60. 
 86. See WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE 
LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 5 (2006) (“[O]ur commitment to 
diversity has redefined the opposition to discrimination as the appreciation (rather than the 
elimination) of difference.”). Walter Benn Michaels’s larger point is that we are in danger of 
allowing our commitment to racial diversity to supplant a commitment to economic equality. 
Id. at 15–20. 
 87. That being said, it does not seem entirely implausible to me that the sentiment 
behind racial eliminativism might provide motivation to some current proponents of 
colorblindness. Justice Thomas might be one such proponent. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 355–57 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (reducing racial diversity to an 
“aesthetic”). 
 88. For an illuminating anecdotal portrayal of this sort of colorblindness, see PATRICIA 
J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 8–9 (1998). 
 89. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783–
85 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that “diversity, depending on its meaning 
and definition, is a compelling educational goal”); id. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by 
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from a rejection of the value of racial diversity.90 We might call this 
view procedural colorblindness. This idea of colorblindness describes 
a side constraint on the considerations that may be taken into 
account in the differential selection of individuals for a particular 
benefit or burden. That constraint is, of course, that the race or color 
of individuals not be considered in any such decision-making 
process. It does not speak to whether we have reason to regard racial 
diversity as a worthwhile goal. The version of colorblindness that 
interests me is a procedural constraint that restricts the ways in which 
we can attempt to arrive at it.91 In an important theoretical way, 
therefore, the value of racial diversity and a commitment to 
colorblindness are orthogonal rather than directly opposed. 
The true opposing correlative of the procedural ideal of 
colorblindness is not racial diversity, then, but rather selecting for 
racial diversity by differentiating among individuals on the basis of 
their race. (I shall hereinafter use “selecting for diversity” as 
shorthand for this longer phrase.) The most obvious reason that 
colorblindness and diversity—though theoretically orthogonal—are 
practically in conflict is that in the actual circumstances of our 
society, meaningful racial diversity can be achieved in certain 
contexts only by directly selecting for it.92 Thus, even though a 
commitment to colorblindness is not logically inconsistent with 
regarding racial diversity as valuable, it can create a practical 
impediment to bringing it about. 
 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (arguing that achieving racial diversity or integration in 
schools constitutes a compelling interest). I assume that Justice Sotomayor would also agree. 
 90. It is true, to be sure, that the notion of colorblindness has come to be identified 
with a particular political sensibility that tends to engender skepticism about the value of racial 
diversity and actions that are designed to promote it. But it is at least conceptually possible to 
value racial diversity while also favoring colorblindness. 
 91. Cf. Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the 
California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1140 (1996) 
(characterizing colorblindness as a sort of “pretending”). 
 92. For example, in the Gratz v. Bollinger litigation, the University of Michigan asserted 
in its brief in opposition to certiorari that if it were not permitted to select for diversity, the 
number of minority students admitted would “drop precipitously, leaving most of [the 
College’s] learning contexts with very few minority students, or none at all.” Respondents’ 
Brief in Conditional Opposition to Certiorari Before Judgment at 9, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
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B. Colorblindness as a Deontological Constraint 
The question I will address with regard to colorblindness, just as 
I did with regard to racial diversity, is why someone might regard 
that procedural ideal as something good, as something that we have 
reason to care about. It seems relatively easy to state various reasons 
in favor of selecting for diversity and sacrificing colorblindness, given 
all that I have said so far. To wit: doing so may be necessary to 
achieve a state of affairs to which we attach positive value. We have 
reason to select for diversity just because and to the extent that we 
have reason to care about the diversity that can thereby be produced. 
What sorts of reasons, then, favor the principle of colorblindness? 
Why should we care about it? We might begin formulating an answer 
by considering how our concern for it falls within the matrix of 
intrinsic vs. extrinsic and instrumental vs. non-instrumental value. Is 
the constraint of colorblindness intrinsically important? There are 
many familiar sorts of circumstances in which the norm of 
colorblindness seems to lack relevance. If we were trying to cast the 
role of Martin Luther King, Jr., in a dramatic production, it seems 
doubtful that we would have any reason to consider using a 
colorblind selection procedure. Similarly, if the victim of a crime 
states with high confidence that her assailant was a white male, the 
colorblindness of a particular investigative technique would not seem 
to provide any reason to recommend following it in the context of 
that particular case.93 The normative significance or value of 
colorblindness is therefore not intrinsic. Arguments in favor of it 
must derive from our commitment to other things (which I will 
consider below), such as the value of certain predicted consequences, 
or a particular conception of equality of treatment implicit in the 
constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection. 
If colorblindness is extrinsically valuable, is its value purely 
instrumental, or is it primarily non-instrumental in character? Let us 
take a step back to understand the question. In thinking about the 
 
 93. Cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 118–20 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing 
Equal Protection challenge against police investigation of local black students and citizens 
based on criminal victim’s description of assailant as a black male with a cut on his hand). But 
cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 785–86 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing persuasively that police might have violated Equal 
Protection Clause by conducting sweeping investigation based on racial description given by 
victim, to the exclusion of other aspects of description that might have called for narrower 
investigation). 
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value of colorblindness, our real interest is in understanding the 
nature of the constraint, if any, it should place on the procedures we 
use in assembling groups of people in certain kinds of institutionally 
significant contexts (schools, workplaces, governments, etc.). 
According to its proponents, the value of colorblindness is not 
merely something that we have reason to see as good, like a healthy 
lifestyle or developing our talents. The reasons in favor of the ideal of 
colorblindness are supposed to have a more peremptory force. The 
principle of colorblindness espoused by Chief Justice Roberts—the 
version that is supposed to invalidate procedures that select directly 
for diversity—demands compliance and renders impermissible those 
actions that violate it. We are to think of it as a source of 
deontological reasons. 
Deontic or deontological reasons are compulsory 
considerations—e.g., duties, obligations, entitlements—that have the 
normative force of a binding command.94 Proponents of the 
principle of colorblindness argue, of course, that the principle derives 
its authority from the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscription against 
denial of equal protection of the laws.95 The principle is supposed to 
provide conclusive reason against using procedures that select 
directly for diversity whatever the beneficial consequences of doing 
so might be. One cannot respect the principle of colorblindness and 
at the same time view it as defeasible whenever the creation of 
diversity would necessitate its override. If the principle is taken 
seriously, the beneficial consequences of violating it simply do not 
count as reasons for doing so,96 except perhaps in extraordinary 
cases.97 
 
 94. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 175–80 (1986); SCANLON, supra 
note 1919, at 81–87; Stephen Darwall, Agent Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out, in 
DEONTOLOGY 113–14 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003). For a wonderfully insightful illustration 
of the force of deontological considerations based on a few simple hypothetical cases, see R. 
Jay Wallace, The Deontic Structure of Morality 1–25 (online paper), http://philosophy. 
berkeley.edu/file/2/Deonticstructure.pdf. 
 95. One might argue that colorblindness is also required by some fundamental moral 
idea of equal treatment or fairness. I raise skeptical questions about this hypothesis below and 
have argued elsewhere against it. See Patrick Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim: The 
Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431 (2005). 
 96. See SCANLON, supra note 19, at 84; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 
39–41 (2d ed. 1990) (proposing the idea of an “exclusionary reason”). 
 97. For one recent account of how deontological constraints (like rights) might permit 
exceptions, see FRANCIS M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 26–40 (2007). 
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This resistance to consequentialist considerations is not unique 
to the ideal of colorblindness. The same applies to any deontological 
restriction, be it the First Amendment prohibition against the 
abridgment of free speech or the general moral prohibition against 
promise-breaking. In each case, the rule creates an obligatory duty 
that cannot be overridden simply for the sake of beneficial 
consequences that would flow from a violation.98 This is so even 
when those consequences tend to support the general policies that 
justify the restriction in the first place.99 For example, suppose I have 
promised to look after your children on Friday night so that you can 
go out with your spouse, and then another friend asks me at the last 
minute to look after her children on that same evening so that she 
can keep promises she made to five friends to take them to dinner. 
The fact that I could prevent five promises from being broken by 
breaking my single promise to you does not provide sufficient reason 
for me to do so; you are entitled to hold me to my promise, even 
though my breaking it would result in a greater number of promises 
being kept overall.100 The constitutional constraints of the First 
Amendment have a similar deontological structure.101 The state 
could not justify suppressing otherwise protected speech—e.g., a 
book arguing that publicly expressing one’s ideas is bad—simply by 
proving that such suppression would result in a net increase in the 
number of people taking part in the public exchange of ideas.102 The 
 
 98. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974) (explaining the 
idea of “side constraints”). 
 99. See NAGEL, supra note 94, at 178–79; NOZICK, supra note 98, at 30; SCANLON, 
supra note 199, at 82–83. 
 100. This aspect of deontological obligation is sometimes called the “paradox of 
deontology.” See Christopher McMahon, The Paradox of Deontology, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
350 (1991); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 8–9 
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1998). 
 101. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (invalidating 
content-based hate crime statute under First Amendment, even though statute served 
compelling state interest in protecting basic human rights). 
 102. I do not mean to suggest that all deontological restrictions have an identical 
structure. In the constitutional context, at least, they do not. The First Amendment 
prohibition on abridgments of free speech is different, for example, from the Fourth 
Amendment restriction on searches and seizures in terms of the kind of justification that would 
permit an exception. Even those who would oppose an absolutist version of constitutional 
colorblindness might support a version of the rule encompassing a more flexible framework of 
exceptions. See Gotanda, supra note 12, at 66–67 (arguing against colorblindness but in favor 
of a constitutional restriction on the use of racial classification modeled on the religion 
clauses). That sort of rule would still entail a deontological restriction insofar as it remained a 
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point is that insofar as colorblindness is a deontological restriction, 
the same kinds of observations apply. For the proponent of 
colorblindness, the positive benefits of racial diversity simply do not 
register as reasons that could be sufficient to justify selecting directly 
for diversity.103 And this is true even if those positive benefits would 
promote the basic policies that underlie the ideal of colorblindness in 
the first place. 
The real question, then, is why the principle of colorblindness 
should be understood in this way, as a deontological restriction that 
invalidates procedures that select for diversity, even when those 
procedures would yield consequences (viz., racial diversity) that 
everyone has reason to value. So let us now consider both the 
instrumental and non-instrumental reasons that might be thought to 
justify the principle of colorblindness. 
C. Instrumentalist Considerations 
The instrumentalist or consequentialist104 defense of 
colorblindness appeals to the value of the good consequences that 
we could expect to flow from adhering to a strict policy of 
colorblindness. Assuming a common goal of eradicating racial 
discrimination and improving the situation of traditionally 
disadvantaged minorities, a proponent of colorblindness might take 
the view that strict adherence to that procedural constraint is simply 
the most effective means of achieving those goals. This is one way of 
interpreting Chief Justice Roberts’ enigmatic claim in Parents 
Involved that the “way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is 
 
peremptory constraint that resisted override on the basis of simple, ad hoc consequentialist 
balancing. 
 103. The proponent does not necessarily believe that the principle of colorblindness must 
be held exceptionless. A deontological obligation can admit exceptions while retaining its 
deontological character, provided that the exceptions are structurally limited to a narrow range 
of application. See, e.g., KAMM, supra note 97. For example, even the proponent of 
colorblindness would allow exceptions for policies that pass “strict scrutiny”—i.e., policies that 
are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest; and even the prohibition on 
intentional killing can give way to certain justified violations, such as self-defense. The larger 
question of the possibility and nature of exceptions to deontological restrictions is beyond my 
scope here. 
 104. In the usual language of moral theory, arguments in favor or against a particular 
action based on instrumental considerations relating to the action’s consequences are called 
“consequentialist.” 
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to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”105 The reference to 
“discriminating on the basis of race” is tendentious in its 
characterization of the race-conscious selection measures used by the 
school districts (what I prefer to call “selecting for diversity”), but 
Roberts’ claim can be understood as an assertion that choosing 
adherence to colorblind procedures over race-conscious methods of 
selecting for diversity will, in the long run, tend to have the 
consequence of reducing the overall occurrence of race 
discrimination106—even if it might seem obstructive or even 
counterproductive in particular cases. 
The main difficulty with this way of understanding the basis of 
the commitment to colorblindness—even putting aside any 
disagreement one might have with the claim on its merits107—is that 
it effectively makes the requirement of colorblindness dependent 
upon a rather controversial prediction of its social effects.108 It seems 
to me implausible that such a speculative empirical hypothesis should 
be thought to be built into the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of Equal Protection. Furthermore, the notion that the principle of 
colorblindness should be followed because of its expected 
consequences seems susceptible to the very same objection that 
Chief Justice Roberts levies against race-conscious methods of 
selecting directly for diversity. Supporters of non-colorblind 
procedures also argue, after all, that reduction of race discrimination 
is among the expected beneficial effects of such measures.109 In his 
 
 105. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007). 
 106. For an interesting argument to the contrary—i.e., that the production of racial 
diversity might be useful as a means of promoting attitudes of colorblindness, see Carbado & 
Gulati, supra note 9, at 1157–58. 
 107. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fifty years of 
experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the problem before us defies 
so easy a solution.” (citation omitted)). 
 108. Another difficulty with the claim is that it characterizes too narrowly the argument 
in favor of selecting for diversity: the goal of creating racial diversity is not just to “stop 
discrimination” but also, arguably, to create conditions of substantive economic equality and 
fair equality of opportunity. It is not clear why adhering to a colorblind ideal should be 
thought to serve those goals. 
 109. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 843–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Some would go 
further to argue that colorblindness would operate to preserve certain forms of racial bias. See 
Elizabeth Anderson, The Future of Racial Integration, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 83, at 241 (“Once we acknowledge that mental states reside 
at various levels of consciousness, the call for conscious color-blindness effectively amounts to a 
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response to Justice Breyer’s call to recognize those benefits, Chief 
Justice Roberts accuses Justice Breyer of making an invalid argument 
that “[t]he end justifies the means.”110 If social benefits do not 
constitute an end sufficient to justify the means of selecting for 
diversity, then it would seem self-contradictory to defend the value 
of the principle of colorblindness in terms of the same kind of 
beneficial effects.111 If the value of adhering to the deontological 
restriction of colorblindness is based purely on its social benefits, 
then the adherent’s charge of arguing from ends to means becomes 
self-defeating. Thus, if Chief Justice Roberts’ assertion that the “way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race”112 is understood as a claim that colorblindness is 
supported by consequentialist, instrumentalist considerations, then it 
is not only enigmatic, but hypocritical. 
D. Non-Instrumentalist Considerations: Justice Harlan’s Argument 
However, the proponent of colorblindness, pace Chief Justice 
Roberts, need not insist that its value lies in its expected beneficial 
consequences. One non-consequentialist argument is that basic 
principles of fairness and formal equality of treatment require 
colorblindness. I am not going to discuss the merits of that familiar 
argument here, except to note that its success ultimately boils down 
to the premise that an individual’s race is never by itself a relevant 
reason for including or excluding him from certain kinds of 
groups.113 Here, however, I am starting from the assumption that 
racial diversity is something we have reason to value. Thus, we have 
already rejected the premise presupposed by the formal equality 
argument: we cannot believe that racial diversity is good without also 
believing that race can be relevant in our judgments about who 
should populate social groups. In other words, if we assume that 
 
call to let unconscious racial biases operate unopposed by conscious policies that might change 
them.”). 
 110.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 743 (Roberts, C.J.). 
 111. It might be argued that colorblindness is simply more effective at eliminating 
discrimination than selecting for diversity, but I do not think the Court could have been 
resting its constitutional conclusions on that baldly empirical claim. 
 112. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
 113. I have elaborated this point elsewhere. See Shin, supra note 95. The basic idea is that 
it is logically inconsistent to hold at the same time that race can be a relevant reason in 
selection decisions and that it always constitutes formal inequality of treatment to treat people 
differently on account of their race. 
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racial diversity has value, then we have already decided that racial 
difference can be a consideration that provides justificatory reasons 
for certain actions or attitudes.114 I do not mean to assert that it 
necessarily follows that differential treatment based on race is 
justified for the sake of creating diversity. The point is that such 
differential treatment might be justified, and so colorblindness 
cannot be regarded as simply falling out of a commitment to equal 
treatment.115 Of course, some proponents of colorblindness might in 
fact believe that race is always irrelevant and that racial diversity has 
no value, but my interest here, again, is in the argument for 
colorblindness (against selecting for diversity) that does not depend 
upon a prior rejection of the value of racial diversity. 
The non-instrumentalist argument supporting the value of 
colorblindness that I do want to explore is the one originally 
articulated by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.116 
This argument invokes the fundamental, non-instrumental norm of 
equal respect. According to this argument, the value of 
colorblindness is that it represents a way of realizing that norm. Here 
is the familiar passage from Harlan’s opinion: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth 
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if 
it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles 
of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye 
of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling 
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In 
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as 
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when 
 
 114. This is just part of what it means, in my view, for something to be valuable. See 
supra note 19. 
 115. Peter Schuck observes that one practical and legal problem created by the fact of 
diversity is that in order for a society to conform its policies to basic principles of “equal 
treatment, dignity, and respect,” it “must first decide which groups are similar enough that 
they must be treated the same, and which are sufficiently different that they fall into different 
categories justifying disparate treatment.” SCHUCK, supra note 13, at 60. The implication here 
is that, as I also suggest, disparate treatment of members of certain different groups might not 
be inconsistent with a commitment to principles of “equal treatment, dignity, and respect.” 
 116. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are 
involved.117 
I quote at length to make clear that, for Harlan, colorblindness 
represents a constitutional commitment to ignore the actual 
superiority and dominance of the “white race.” Colorblindness is 
after all, a defect of vision consisting in an inability to discern certain 
differences that really do exist.118 Harlan’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment thus embodies a strange sort of aspirational 
commitment. His claim is that it should be read to contain a self-
imposed blindness to the actual differences among the races as a way 
of realizing the racial anti-subordination principle he sees embedded 
in the Equal Protection Clause. Constitutional colorblindness 
expresses equal respect for the legal rights and status of individuals 
who, by virtue of their race, might otherwise be regarded as inferior 
or less deserving of legal protection.119 
This second justification for the principle of colorblindness is 
non-consequentialist and non-instrumentalist in that it does not 
depend on the value of further effects that adherence might be 
expected to produce. Generally stated, the argument is that we 
should commit ourselves to the ideal of colorblindness because it 
expresses a moral and constitutional truth, namely, that all individuals 
are entitled, regardless of their race, to equal respect under the 
laws.120 On this rationale, we adhere to colorblind procedures not 
primarily because this is a way to achieve some desired social result, 
but because in doing so, we affirm our commitment to a 
fundamental principle of equality.121 
 
 117. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 118. That Justice Harlan believed that there were real differences between the races is 
reinforced by his infamous remarks later in his dissent: “There is a race so different from our 
own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. . . . I 
allude to the Chinese race.” Id. at 561. 
 119. Cf. Siegel, supra note 12, at 127 (arguing that the rhetoric of formal colorblindness 
“can be understood, historically and contextually, as repudiating the relevance claims of status-
race talk,” i.e., ascriptions of differential social status according to race). 
 120. For an account of the notion of expressive action generally and of the expressive 
concerns embodied in the Equal Protection Clause in particular, see Elizabeth Anderson & 
Richard Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 
1533–45 (2000). 
 121. One might ask why expressing a value through adherence to a principle should not 
be considered analogous to engaging in a particular action for the instrumental purpose of 
sending a signal. The difference is that in sending a signal, one acts for the sake of a particular 
communicative consequence, whereas in acting to express commitment to a particular norm, 
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These are powerful ideas and cannot lightly be dismissed. Their 
implications for how we should think about race-conscious methods 
for creating diversity in the context of contemporary controversies, 
however, depend upon the extent to which we can still say, as Justice 
Harlan suggested in the context of his day, that colorblindness 
expresses a principle of equal respect. That is not a proposition on 
which everyone will agree, but one can say at least this much: the 
rejection of colorblindness signified something far different in the 
context of Plessy than it signifies in the context of cases like Parents 
Involved. Harlan was surely justified in suggesting that principles 
permitting race-based classifications in his time were largely 
expressions of white supremacy and privilege.122 In that society, there 
was no concept of using racial preference as a means of reducing 
inequality; so for the state to legitimize race conscious action was 
tantamount to condoning existing structures of racial subordination. 
By contrast, in today’s society no one thinks that the sort of race-
conscious differential treatment at issue in Parents Involved entails 
expressing approval for any such practice. We might disagree about 
whether selecting directly for racial diversity is, all things considered, 
a good thing; but the alternative to a commitment to colorblindness 
for us is not, as it might have been in the eyes of Justice Harlan, 
endorsement of a principle or practice of racial subordination.  
For Justice Harlan, a commitment to colorblindness constituted 
a necessary and uniquely powerful expression of the repudiation of 
official policies of racial subordination.123 What I am claiming is that 
colorblindness no longer has that sort of expressive value. I do not 
think anyone could plausibly maintain in the context of our current 
circumstances that adherence to the principle of colorblindness is a 
unique expression of the repudiation of practices of racial 
subordination.124 To the contrary, I believe adherence to 
 
the action is not done for the sake of communicating that commitment (although it might of 
course have that effect). Rather, in order for an action to express a norm, the norm itself must 
be regarded as a reason for the action. Signaling is an empirical effect of action, whereas the 
expressive content of an action is given by a relation between the action and the norms that are 
regarded as guiding it. 
 122. See Gotanda, supra note 12, at 39. 
 123. Cf. Siegel, supra note 12, at 127. 
 124. Yet, in his concurrence in Adarand, Justice Thomas declared, “I believe that there is 
a moral and constitutional equivalence . . . between laws designed to subjugate a race and 
those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of 
equality.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
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colorblindness has come to be identified with a certain sort of 
fairness or formal equality objection to policies of race-based 
preference (which I briefly mentioned and set aside at the beginning 
of this section).125 Policies that promote racial diversity seem more 
aligned with ideals of substantive equality of citizenship126 and the 
elimination of racial stratification.127 Some would even argue that a 
commitment to colorblindness signifies views that are themselves 
objectionable.128 In any case, the value of colorblindness can no 
longer be identified—and certainly not uniquely identified—with the 
fundamental norm of equal respect of which it might historically 
have been an expression. 
What, then, are we left with? The consequentialist arguments for 
colorblindness seem insufficient to justify adherence to it as a 
deontological constraint. If we start with the supposition that racial 
diversity is something we have reason to care about (for any of the 
reasons discussed earlier), the argument that colorblindness is 
required as a matter of formal equality also becomes ineffectual. The 
most powerful defense of the principle of colorblindness might have 
been the argument that adherence to that norm constitutes an 
expression of the substantive principle of equal respect and anti-
subordination embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, but that 
 
concurring) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). That remark does seem 
to suggest that relaxing the constraint of colorblindness is morally tantamount to racial 
subjugation. A few paragraphs later in the opinion, however, Justice Thomas spells out what 
seems to be his real concern: that race-conscious procedures have a “destructive impact on the 
individual and our society” because they “may cause [minorities] to develop dependencies or 
to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to preferences.” Id. at 240–41. This concern might 
support a consequentialist argument against race-conscious procedures, but it hardly proves a 
moral “equivalence” between abandoning colorblindness and policies of racial subjugation. 
 125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (O’Connor, J.); Kenneth L. 
Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 72–73 
(2004) (arguing that Grutter’s diversity rationale is based on an ideal of equal citizenship); 
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–62 (2003) (discussing various broadly 
democratic values implicit in Grutter’s diversity rationale). 
 127. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 241; Siegel, supra note 12, at 143–48 (arguing 
that colorblindness discourse, historically identified with a commitment to nondiscrimination 
and equality, has become an impediment to the elimination of racial stratification). 
 128. One might argue, for example, that in today’s society, colorblindness does not 
express a principle of equal respect but rather expresses disregard for the problems of racial 
inequality that persist. Cf. Gotanda, supra note 12, at 62–63 (“[M]odern color-blind 
constitutionalism supports the supremacy of white interests and must therefore be regarded as 
racist.”). 
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argument has become anachronistic and obsolete. The deontological 
conception of colorblindness, for all of its basic intuitive appeal, 
seems to elude any ready justification. 
E. The “Racial Chits” Objection to Selecting for Diversity 
Perhaps there is another avenue to explore. The final argument 
for the value of colorblindness that I shall consider is suggested by 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved. Although Justice 
Kennedy explicitly distances himself from Chief Justice Roberts’ 
absolute commitment to an ideal of colorblindness,129 he voices 
concerns about selecting directly for diversity that I think must be 
taken seriously. These concerns can be viewed as an indirect 
argument for moving in the direction of colorblindness based on a 
certain negative value attaching to the act of selecting directly for 
racial diversity. 
While taking the position that some consideration of race may be 
permitted for the sake of creating diversity in educational contexts,130 
Justice Kennedy asserts that “[r]eduction of an individual to an 
assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among the most 
pernicious actions our government can undertake.”131 He suggests 
that it would be constitutionally intolerable for a school district to 
manufacture racially diverse student bodies by making assignment 
determinations based solely on race: “Crude measures of this sort 
threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded 
according to one school’s supply and another’s demand.”132 
Justice Kennedy’s remarks are, in an important and perhaps 
surprising way, closely related to Justice Harlan’s argument for 
colorblindness. Justice Harlan advocated for colorblindness as a 
positive expression of a principle of equal respect embedded in the 
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy argues against “crude” 
methods of selecting for racial diversity because they express an 
attitude that violates that principle of equal respect. For Justice 
Kennedy, the problem with such methods is not that they express a 
judgment of the superiority of one race over another (which was 
 
 129. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787–
88 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 130. See id. at 797–98. 
 131. Id. at 795. 
 132. Id. at 798. 
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Harlan’s concern in Plessy), but that they express an attitude that 
treats individuals as nothing more than countable “chits,” items to 
be accumulated or exchanged as necessary in order to balance 
accounts. These methods are objectionable because they evince a 
failure of respect, a failure to treat people as individuals capable of 
rational choice and to whom we are morally answerable.133 Whereas 
for Harlan, the value of colorblindness consists in the attitude it 
expresses, for Kennedy, the value of colorblindness (or at least some 
measure of it) is a function of the disvalue of the attitude expressed 
by crude methods of selecting for diversity. But their positions are 
related in their concern for the non-instrumental, expressive value or 
disvalue of the constitutional principles to which we choose to 
commit ourselves. 
There are at least two possible responses to Justice Kennedy’s 
line of argument, the “racial chits” objection. One response is on the 
facile side: although it may be true that certain “crude” methods of 
selecting for diversity express a failure of respect for individuals, this 
is not strictly speaking a problem of equality, so long as the method 
in question reduces everyone to a “racial chit.” In other words, even 
if the “crude” methods that Justice Kennedy has in mind are 
objectionable in virtue of expressing a lack of respect for individuals, 
this is of no particular concern for the Equal Protection Clause, 
insofar as that constitutional command is violated only by actions 
that evince unequal respect for some classes of individuals compared 
to others. Thus, one might agree that the “racial chits” objection is 
well taken but be skeptical whether the objection is properly 
associated with considerations having to do with equality. 
The more important response, however, requires acknowledging 
that certain “crude” methods for creating diversity might indeed be 
objectionable because of what they express about the status of the 
individuals who will be affected. This seems to me an important 
insight. But I do not think it follows that a commitment to 
constitutional values of equal respect requires that such methods, 
“crude” or not, always be rejected. The racial chits objection seems 
to assume that procedures that crudely select for racial diversity are at 
best instrumentally valuable as a means of producing racial diversity 
(a valuable state of affairs), but that they always express an attitude 
 
 133. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (discussing the 
implications of equal respect and concern for the permissibility of affirmative action). 
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that is inconsistent with our constitutional commitment to treating 
all individuals with equal respect. Thus, on this view, since our 
(deontological) constitutional commitment trumps the instrumental 
value of selecting for diversity, those selection methods are 
impermissible. 
What the racial chits objection seems to overlook is the 
contingent character of the expressive content of our actions.134 Just 
as we saw in the case of colorblindness, adherence to a particular 
principle of action may signify one thing under one set of 
circumstances and something different under another. Measures that 
reduce an individual’s status to a racial category are surely demeaning 
and offensive when they are implemented in the service of a social 
order that seeks to preserve structures of racial hierarchy and 
stratification. But do they necessarily have that same character when 
in the service of a collective effort to prevent or rectify such hierarchy 
and stratification? What if those problems of inequality have been 
persistent and intractable? And what if “crude” methods of 
managing racial integration have offered the best hope for progress 
in alleviating those problems? Given the right conditions, a 
community’s implementation of procedures that aim directly at racial 
integration and diversity might, I would think, express a 
commitment to the substantive equality of all of its members. This is 
not “expression” in a merely symbolic sense, but rather in a 
constitutive sense. By adopting procedures that select directly for 
racial diversity in institutionally significant settings, a community that 
is plagued with problems of racial inequality and stratification can 
perhaps constitute itself as a community that cares about the equal 
status of its members. In the right context, in other words, perhaps 
adopting measures that select directly for diversity just is what it 
takes for a community to treat its members with equal respect and 
concern.135 If that is the case, then contrary to the racial chits 
 
 134. Cf. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 120. 
 135. Does this constitutive expressive relation between selecting for diversity and a 
commitment to equality depend on the actual efficacy of those selection methods in creating 
the envisioned equality? On the one hand, I think that to some extent, a community’s decision 
to select directly for diversity can express a commitment to equality whether or not the 
selection methods actually succeed in bringing about equality. Thus, I think that selecting for 
diversity can express a commitment to equality even if it is empirically uncertain whether the 
measures in question will turn out to be effective in the long run. But on the other hand, it 
seems to me we must say that the expressive value of selecting for diversity must to some extent 
be derivative of the value of the diversity that is actually produced. To take the extreme case, if 
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objection, a commitment to the creation of diversity without 
procedural indirection might be seen as a realization of the values 
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause, rather than trumped by 
it. 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
My goal has been to understand the nature of the value of racial 
diversity, the value of adhering to an ideal of colorblindness, and 
how those values come into opposition. I have mapped out what I 
view as the main categories of arguments. I conclude with a few 
observations about the implications of occupying the various value 
positions I have staked out. 
First, although I have considered each argument for the value of 
diversity and colorblindness on its independent merits, it is of course 
possible to hold that racial diversity or colorblindness is worth caring 
about for a variety of reasons that span the various categories I have 
delineated. This simple point can have important implications. For 
example, insofar as we regard racial diversity in particular contexts as 
having both instrumental and non-instrumental value, we should be 
careful not to overemphasize the significance of ongoing empirical 
findings regarding whether or not cultivating racial diversity is useful 
for producing certain kinds of beneficial effects. In other words, if we 
do place at least some non-instrumental value on racial diversity, 
then negative empirical findings on the effects of diversity should not 
be seen as necessarily fatal to the project of promoting it. 
Second, I think that the way that racial diversity is valued in 
some contexts may paradoxically undercut arguments for aiming 
directly at it in others. For example, I described an “evidential” view 
of the value of diversity, according to which racial diversity is good 
for a community in the same sense a wet nose is good for a dog: it is 
a sign of healthy functioning. Or, racial diversity might be regarded 
as an indicator that a community is committed to a certain ethos of 
equality or vision of justice. But if this is the best way to think about 
the good of racial diversity, then aiming at racial diversity for the 
sake of equality or justice might seem to take on a peculiar character, 
perhaps akin to splashing water on a dog’s dry nose for the sake of its 
 
it became inarguably clear that racial diversity itself had no effect on redressing problems of 
racial inequality in a society, then I would think that a commitment to selecting for diversity 
could no longer succeed in expressing a commitment to equality. 
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health, i.e., treating the manifestation rather than the root cause of 
racial inequality or injustice. This seems to me an important worry, 
but not a conclusive argument against selecting for diversity and 
adopting a policy of colorblindness. Creating diversity is generally 
not easy. In the contexts where we care about it most, adopting the 
goal of racial diversity is itself a significant commitment, and then 
actually achieving it requires deep institutional resolve. Thus, it 
seems hard to imagine that a non-diverse community could make 
itself racially diverse in a way that failed to touch whatever had been 
the root cause of its former lack of diversity. Putting it another way, 
I think it is plausible that the very institutional changes required to 
produce racial diversity may also work to alleviate the root sources of 
inequalities that would explain its absence. If that is true, then even if 
the value of diversity is regarded as primarily evidential, there might 
be no illogic in aiming at it as a surrogate for the conditions of 
equality and justice that we really have reason to care about. 
Third, I have asserted that the value of racial diversity is in 
important respects orthogonal to the procedural ideal of 
colorblindness, and that the real conflict is between a commitment 
to colorblindness and adopting procedures that involve selecting for 
diversity. But if the positive value of racial diversity and selecting for 
it stand in need of affirmative argument, then so should the value of 
colorblindness. One cannot simply invoke the ideal of colorblindness 
as a self-evident truth. Indeed, I have suggested that if one begins 
with the premise that racial diversity does indeed have positive value 
(based on any or all of the arguments articulated in the first part of 
this Article), it becomes rather difficult to articulate a robust 
argument in favor of strict adherence to the constraint of 
colorblindness, at least as a matter of equal treatment. (This is 
because colorblindness as a principle of equal treatment presupposes 
that race is always an irrelevant difference; but if we attach a positive 
value to racial diversity, it follows that race in some sense does matter, 
which undercuts the required presupposition.) 
Finally, I have tried to show that in the debate about the 
commitment to colorblindness versus the adoption of procedures 
that select for diversity, a large part of the controversy may have to 
do with conflicting notions about the normative commitments that 
particular actions may properly be regarded to express. Proponents of 
colorblindness tend to argue that a commitment to that ideal is a 
direct expression or realization of the fundamental principle of equal 
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respect contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. I have asserted 
that the original power of the argument for colorblindness consisted 
in its being a unique expression of the repudiation of 
institutionalized white supremacy and of policies of racial 
subordination. In today’s circumstances, however, a commitment to 
colorblindness does not have that same expressive value. Indeed, if 
living up to the ideals of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
committing ourselves to making actual progress toward equal 
citizenship and the elimination of racial stratification, direct methods 
of selecting for racial diversity and producing integrated 
communities are arguably a more faithful expression and realization 
of the basic principles of equal respect and concern embodied in the 
guarantee of Equal Protection. 
 
 
